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In his introduction to the 1978 Conference papers on Small Urban Centers in Rural Development in Africa, Southall (1979: 1-2) suggests that the relations between these centers and their hinterlands are largely oppressive and exploitative, and, in the absence of fundamental social transformation, unlikely to change. The Zambian rural centers studied by this author (Siegel, 1979) strayed some from this general pattern. Nearly all were relatively recent extensions of the national and provincial governmental agencies. And given Zambia's foreign exchange crisis at that time, and the consequent shortage of goods and services of every kind, the influence of these peripheral centers was far more ineffectual than exploitative.
Exploitative relations did exist, but these were focused upon the continuing political, economic, and social domination by the neighboring "primate" cities of Ndola and Luanshya, both of which were colonially created administrative, commercial, and industrial centers in Zambia's historically dual and increasingly polarized economy (Baldwin, 1966: 40-57, 214-21; Barber, 1967; Southall, 1979: 14) . When combined with the foreign exchange crisis, the producer's price structure then in effect had so limited rural livelihood opportunities in central Ndola Rural District that nearly half of the able-bodied males had left their homes to single women, the very old, and the very young (Siegel, 1984: 104-8) . Zambians in general disparage the drudgery and poverty of "sleepy" village life, and this is especially true in the Copperbelt, where there is an 80-year-old history of derogatory stereotypes about the "backward," "weak," and "lazy" Lamba villagers (Siegel, 1984: 54-85, & n.d.) .
The notion that urban centers are oppressive and exploitative of their hinterlands has a history of its own, as reflected in the various theories concerning the origin of the state (Service 1978) . Hoselitz (1955) , among many others, reached similar conclusions in his discussion of the permanent "parasitism" of colonial centers, the technical and economic enclaves found in dual economies. Barber (1967) later extended Hoselitz's views to the cities of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. While finding that "the relationship between urbanization and economic growth in this part of the continent is ambiguous," Barber said that the African benefits from such centers were "weak" and tended toward the parasitic--particularly in regard to the European controls over all forms of production, over wages and income distribution, and the consequent limitations placed upon African farmers (pp. 114, 118-19) . But such ideas are not limited to liberal academicians. For in his 1951 comments upon the "demoralized" Lamba cultivators of rural Ndola District, their grinding impoverishment, and the youthful exodus to the cities, the District Commissioner acknowledged that these were the consequences of "economic and social forces at work which it was difficult, if not impossible, to control" (NR n.d. d).
The Copperbelt chiefdoms, however, were also linked to still earlier and larger chiefly centers and their transcontinental trade routes. By 1800, for example, copper ingots from the Lunda empire were sold at the Mbangala trade fair at Cassange (Vellut, 1972: 88-90) . These, like supplies of salt and slaves, almost certainly originated as tribute to Mwata Kazembe's capital on the Luapula River (Beadle, 1873: 188, 221-3, 228-31; Burton 1873: 99; Cuvelier, 1932: 175; Marchal, 1939: 10, 17, and 1946-47: 85-6) . By mid-century, however, the Lunda trade monopoly had been broken. In the west, the Chokwe and Lwena expansions gave Mbundu and Mambari traders access to Mwata Yamvo's former tributaries (Vellut, 1972: 143-57) . Further east, the Luba, Bemba, and Ngoni expansions allowed Msiri's Yeke (Nyamwezi) and Swahili gunmen to seize control of Kazembe's Copperbelt tributaries by exploiting chiefly rivalries and succession disputes in southern Katanga (Grevisse, 1950: 48, 66-7; Marchal, 1939:14-16; Tilsely, 1929: 134-41; Verbeken 1956: 37-65) . Still other Yeke captains raided as far as the Kaonde, Lamba, Lima, and Lenje chiefdoms in Zambia's upper Kafue Basin (Chibanza, 1961: 59-61, 102-13; Doke, 1931: 41-2; NR n.d. a; Verdick, 1952: 34-41) .
About 1880, Msiri moved from the chiefdoms near Kambove to settle in the Lufira Valley. His new capital, called Bunkeya by the Belgians, was the largest of the Copperbelt's precolonial centers: "an immense and cosmopolitan metropolis" of some 25,000 people in 42 contiguous villages (Tilsley, 1929: 135-6 ; also Verbeken, 1956: 80-81; Verdick, 1952: 32-40 (Arnot, 1889: 235 (Macpherson, 1981: 43-44, 72-73; Verbeken, 1956: 166-70) . Advised of Rhodes' designs, Leopold, in August, had ordered the EIC to establish its presence in Katanga. But the first of three Belgian expeditions to Bunkeya was unable to leave the Sankuru District post and Lusambo until Christmas Day of 1890 (Verbeken, 1956: 181; Verdick, 1952: 20-22 (Marchal, 1939 :1 2-17; also Capello and Ivens, 1886: 51, 157; Verbeken, 1956: 124-27, 130-32) . The local Sanga, Misiri's allies, envied his trade monopoly, and by the time the first Belgians reached Bunkeya, in April 1891, the Sanga were also in rebellion. They abandoned Bunkeya, cut off its food and gunpowder supplies, and so transformed it into "'just a stinking hole, a waterless and shadeless valley, where there [was] nothing but a few villages and sorghum plots"' (Dr. Briart, in Verbeken, 1956:82; also Verbeken, 1956:171-79; Verdick, 1952:45-47) .
While suspicious of the Belgians and their mineral interests, Msiri needed powder and allies against the Sanga rebels. So, in June, he permitted two Belgian and 30 Dahomean solidiers to establish Lofoi Post, 30 miles east of Bunkeya on a site once occupied by a Lunda tribute collector (Verdick, 1952:36, 42, 47-54) . However the Belgians made their assistance contingent upon Msiri's acknowledging the EIC's sovereignty. This he refused to do, believing, when the second expedition left in October, that Alfred Sharpe and BSAC would soon return to chase the Belgians from Lofoi (Gouldsbury and Sheane, 1911: 39; Verbeken, 1956: 169-70, 202, 210-12; Verdick, 1952: 32-4, 54-5, 58) . Captain Stairs' group of Britons did arrive from Bagamoyo in December 1891 and were warmly welcomed. But they proved to be Leopold's mercenaries rather than envoys from Sharpe. Within a week of their arrival, in attempting his arrest, Msiri was shot dead. The Yeke empire collapsed, and Bunkeya was abandoned-at least until 1910, when smallpox, Belgian food demands, and presumably, word of the 1911 impot indigene prompted the Yeke to return (Verbeken, 1956:212-51; Verdick, 1952:55-60; Higginson, 1979:116) .
Such were the precolonial centers in the Copperbelt. By exploiting natural trading and craft production sites, the chiefly capitals became tributaries of the Lunda and Yeke capitals. While still controlled by Africans, Bunkeya's extractive system became so parasitic that competition between the BSAC and EIC only hastened, rather than caused, its inevitable collapse.
CHIWALA'S SWAHILI AND ANGLO-BELGIAN ANTAGONISMS
During the Copperbelt's endemic famine, warfare, and locust and rinderpest epidemics of the early 1890s, the EIC forces at Lusambo were so preoccupied with the Arab and Swahili slavers farther east that the garrison at Lofoi, a 10-week journey away, was left to its own devices for nearly two years (Delvaux, 1950: 36-37, 42; Verdick, 1952: 58-65) . Though eventually supplied from Lake Mweru by the African Lakes Company after 1897, Lofoi Post was also isolated from the Yeke of Mukanda Bantu, Msiri's son and successor. They welcomed the EIC's protection from the Sanga and as Belgian sentinelles were appointed to collect and deliver food and ivory from their assigned villages farther south. The Belgians decided to follow and in 1898-9 abandoned the mosquito-infested site at Lofoi for Lufaku Post (Fetter, 1976: 18; Lambert-Culot, 1972: 276-7; Vellut, 1977: 298; Verdick, 1952: 62, 78, 110-12, 128-9, 146) . There, to supply his troops with food, Captain Verdick organized the Copperbelt's first marketplace and hosted chiefly beer drinks to discuss "their rights, their duties, the benefits of civilization," and "the evils of slavery, as exemplified by the Lamba lands, which the slavers had gradually depopulated" (Verdick, 1952: 148; Miracle, 1969: 224-5) .
Following the collapse of the Yeke empire, the worst of these southern Katangan slavers were the eight bands of Nyasaland Swahili affiliated with Chiwala. They not only exacted slaves and ivory from the Lamba, Lala, and Aushi chiefdoms between the Kafue River and Lake Bangweulu, but after repulsing a Belgian patrol in 1896, threatened the Plymouth Brethren, who had moved to Lake Mweru and Luapula two years earlier (Doke, 1931: 33-7; Stephenson, 1972: 22-33; Verdick, 1952: 74; also Gelfand, 1961: 66-7; Tilsley, 1929: 412, 415 (Delvaux, 1950: 48-54; O'Brien, 1957; Stephenson, 1972: 33-41; Verdick, 1952: 73-7, 118, 120-23) .
"An Arab called Chiwallah", as George Grey observed, on his first prospecting expedition to the Katangan border in July 1899, "...is much feared by the natives in the neighborhood, and has established a reign of terror over a considerable area" (Grey, 1901: 73) . Cornered in the Copperbelt, Chiwala's Swahili altered their livelihood to include rice farming from their new stockade village. Whereas most of their new Lamba and Lima captives were kept as domestic slaves, others were redeemed with ivory. They then traded the ivory to the Mbundu, or by 1900, to Adolph Bolle and William Ziehl, unscrupulous Luapula traders who were wanted by both the EIC and BSAC authorities (Chesnaye, 1901: 46-7; BSAC, 1903: 446; 451-3; Delvaux, 1950: 77-82; Macpherson, 1981: 90-91; Stephenson n.d. a; 1937: 77; 1972: 29) .
The North-Eastern Rhodesian authorities had yet to occupy the Copperbelt and only established Chiwala's whereabouts in May 1900, when Secretary C.P. Chesnaye, a manager for Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., and the BSAC Collector for the new Serenje and Ft. Rosebery Bomas entered his village to establish his loyalties, and to win his help in arresting Bolle and Ziehl (Chesnaye, 1901; Macpherson, 1981: 91; Stephenson n.d. a) .
Unlike the Belgian officers of BSAC Collectors, the administrators at Ft. Jameson had a higher regard for these Nyalsaland Swahili than for the peoples that they raided. Whereas Collector Kennelly, like Delvaux (1950: 37, 42) and Verdick (1952: 118-23) in Katanga, held the Swahili responsible for the concealed and abandoned villages of the "shy", "scattered", and food-short Lamba he had encountered west of Chiwala's village, Secretary Chesnaye (later, Acting Administrator) instead, admired Chiwala's orderly village, the Swahili's industry, their "well-fed and prosperous appearance", and Chiwala's "friendly attitude" (Chesnaye, 1901: 46-7) . Chesnaye was not the first administrator to favor the Swahili, for two years earlier Lt. Delvaux received a letter from Johnston Falls (Old Ft. Rosebery) which demanded compensation for the prisoners, livestock, and ivory which "'poor old chief Chiwala'" had lost when he was driven from the Pedicle (Delvaux, 1950: 53) .
This was only one in a series of incidents which fostered Belgian suspicions about the BSAC and its designs. The EIC had won the contest for Katanga, but it still had to deal with the Plymouth Brethren missionaries, who were suspected of espionage and of subverting African loyalties, and unscrupulous British traders, who not only smuggled ivory and rubber across the frontier, but traded with the rebel Tetela soldiers farther north (Delvaux, 1950: 59, 72-84, 88; Verdick, 1952: 88, 125, 150) . What was worse, the EIC, with never more than six Belgians in Katanga before 1900, was dependent upon the British-on the African Lakes Company-for provisioning its southeastern forces, and on Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. (TCL), a partially owned BSAC subsidiary, for pegging and developing Katanga's mineral wealth (Fetter, 1976: 18-19) .
EARLY COLONIAL CENTERS IN THE RHODESIAN COPPERBELT
The BSAC's claims to the Copperbelt were initially based on the 1890 treaties collected by explorer Joseph Thomson-particularly his November 1890 treaty with Lamba chief Mushili (Faber, 1917: 1; Krishnamurthy, 1969) . Though hired by Rhodes to treat with Msiri, Thomson's caravan was carrying smallpox and had to return to Blantyre after reaching the Kafue and Lenje chief Chipepo (later entitled Mukonchi) (Thomson, 1893) . Given Rhodes' hand in this, it is not suprising that the Rhodesian Copperbelt was occupied by prospectors and mining camps before the earliest administrative centers were established. These extractive "collection posts," to borrow Lambert-Culot's (1972: 302-3) terminology, not only preceded the "outposts of occupation," but they were generally separate, and there was rarely any doubt that the former were meant to be served by the latter. (Bulpin, 1959: 163, 177-8, 214; O'Brien, 1957; Stephenson, 1972: 41; Verdick, 1952: 123) . While only occupied for about a year, Ft. Elwes seems to have been the Smitheman expedition's greatest success, for it found no mineral deposits. Yet on his return Smitheman prepared a report on the availability of Yeke and other North-Eastern Rhodesian labor for the mines in Bulawayo and South Africa, and Collins, a member of his party, traveled to the Kafue River in 1901 as a labor recruiter for the Kimberley mines (Bulpin, 1959 : 214, Sampson, 1956 . This report is of particular interest here, for while it endorses the labor potential of the Lamba's Swaka, Lala, and Aushi neighbors, Smitheman doubted that the "very timid" Lamba could "be very much use for work" (Smitheman, in Macpherson, 1981: 150) .
Frank Lewis, Orlando Baragwanath, and the other Northern Copper Company prospectors were more fortunate. Between 1897 and 1902, three of these expeditions discovered most of the abandoned copper workings in the northern Kafue Hook and the Rhodesian Copperbelt--like the Sable Antelope, Nchanga (near Chingola), and Bwana Mkubwa (Ndola) mines, as well as new deposits of silver at the Silver King, copper at Roan Antelope (Luanshya), and Broken Hill's (Kabwe) lead and zinc. Mining began at the Silver King by 1900, and for a time it seemed certain that the projected Cape-toCairo railway would be routed through the Kafue Hook (Bulpin, 1959; Gelfand, 1961: 118-19; Jones, 1903; RCM, 1978: 18-21; Shaw, 1952) .
Such plans, however, were eventually scuttled following George Grey's Congo border expendition of 1899. Sent from Bulawayo by Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. under its contract with the Compagnie du Katanga, Grey, together with four prospectors and 25 armed Africans, claimed the Chambeshi, Nkana (Kitwe), and Kansanshi copper workings on the southern side of the border, and the Lufira gold pans and Kipushi copper workings to the north (near Kambove). These latter discoveries persuaded the newly chartered Comite Special du Katanga to grant Robert Williams' TCL exclusive prospecting and mining rights in southern Katanga, as well as a share of the future profits (Chibanza, 1961: 112-13; Fetter, 1976: 19-22; Grey, 1901; Perrings, 1979: 9-10; RCM, 1978: 19, 51, 64) .
With Kansanshi as its base, Grey's second, much larger expedition in 1901-2 established a network of grain trading and labor recruiting camps, located another 50 Katangan copper deposits and cut a 350-mile wagon road from Nkala Mission to the new Kansanshi mine (Gann, 1964: 119-21; Gelfand, 1961: 120-23; RCM, 1978: 19-21; Scannell, 1961) . Besides routing the future railway through Katanga, Grey's operations along the upper Kafue Basin and the Katangan border were ultimately responsible for ending the Copperbelt slave trade.
Still sparsely populated today, the area between the Lunga and Luswishi Rivers was an elephant hunter's no-man's-land between the Kaonde to the west, and the Lamba and Lima farther east. Here, since the 1850s, the Mbundu and Mambari ivory, rubber, and slave trading caravans had established staging posts, with temporary huts and gardens, where smaller trading parties would reassemble before returning toward Lake Dilolo and Bihe (Denny, 1957: 334; Gelfand, 1961: 73; Steel, 1917: 182-4; Vellut, 1972: 131-9) . The same area later attracted settlements of Yeke, Chikunda, Mbwela, and Swahili (nearly all of whom dealt in slaves) and by 1900, at least a dozen European traders.
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Localized slave raiding not only threatened the lives and property of these European traders, but the food and labor supplies to the 50 Europeans who were based at Kansanshi and Kafue Hook mines between 1899 and 1902. 2 The Mbundu and Mambari still operated with impunity, but their slave caravans now had to cross Grey's Nkala-toKansanshi road and so had difficulty escaping notice (Gelfand, 1961:79) .
Continued slave raiding and trading were clearly incompatible with European mining and commercial interests, and in August 1900, three BSAC agents settled in NorthEastern Rhodesia, east of the Kafue River. These were agent Val Gielgud, from Kalomo at Muyanga Station near the Northern Copper Company's Kafue Hook camp at Ninga; and Collectors F.E.F. Jones and J.E. (Chirupula) Stephenson, from Ft. Jameson in the northern and eastern areas of Kafue District. While Gielgud's assignment was to report on local conditions and to prepare its peoples for peaceful administration, he used his 20 Ndebele Native Police to harass the slave traders, and by staging punitive raids against hostile Ila, Lenje, and Soli villages, to impress these peoples with the power and prestige of the callous Europeans in their midst (BSAC, 1903: 407; Denny, 1957; Gelfand, 1961: 39-40, 79-82; Macpherson, 1981: 87-90) . Gielgud and Grey's complaints about the slave traders brought Colonel Harding and the Barotse Native Police to patrol 1 These European ivory and rubber traders' accounts are drawn from Sampson's (1956) catalogue of early Northern Rhodesian residents, and supplemented by Bulpin (1959) and Stephenson (1937) . Since most of these individuals are listed in Sampson (1956) , I have omitted references to this source. It should also be kept in mind that these ivory and/or rubber traders also pursued other careers in grain or cattle trading, mineral prospecting, labor recruiting, or the BSAC administration.
Aside from Albert Bolle and William Ziehl, and the Swahili's outlaw trading partners near Ndola, these ivory and/or rubber traders included Adolph Ullman at Kapopo (Doke 1975: 44; Masters and Masters, 1920: 21-3, 47-8; Moubray, 1912: 103-4) ; L. Stem, who worked near Ndola before his death in 1902 (Stephenson, 1937: 163) ; and George Hepburn and John Lanegan O'Keefe, who traded among the Kaonde on the upper Lunga River (Gelfand, 1961: 151; Stephenson, n.d. a and 1937: 147) . A certain Price abandoned rubber trading in the Nchanga area for a mine stores job at Ninga, on the Kafue Hook (Bulpin, 1959: 223-4, 232) , and Louis De Fries seems to have traded near Kapopo before being appointed the Kafue Hook Rubber Conservator (BSAC 1903: 416-17; Hobson 1960: 494-5; Stephenson, 1937: 163-75, 210) . Stephenson also mentions a Swedish elephant hunter and ivory trader near old Mkushi Boma (Stephenson, 1937: 163-4) .
Other traders dealt in grain, cattle, or other unspecified goods. Zimmerman, Diammoch (Sampson's C.A. Dimmock?), Norton, and James Green all traded for grain in the Kafue Hook (Gelfand, 1961: 120; Stephenson, 1937: 269) . Argenta, an Italian, Pereira, and an anonymous Portuguese dealt in cattle along the Kafue River, as did Alfred F. Miles and Ernest D. Fairbanks, who was killed by the Soli in 1901 when he tried taking some to Southern Rhodesia (Bulpin, 1959: 188, 191, 193, 195, 244; Stephenson, 1937: 148-54, 164-5, 192-7) . An Eduardo, a Portuguese, was on the Kafue in 1898, and a "Dutch" trader, Strakan, was near old Mkushi in 1901 (Stephenson, 1937: 148) . the western side of the Kafue River in 1900 and led to the opening of the Nkala and Kasempa police camps in 1901, and of Kasempa Boma in 1904 (Chibanza, 1961: 68-9; Clark, 1955; Gelfand, 1961: 79; Rennie and Mubita, 1985: 53) .
Collectors Jones and Stephenson, by comparison, had been sent to both occupy and administer the areas to the north and east, yet had just 10 "Nyasa" (Lakeside Tonga) askari apiece (BSAC, 1903: 407, 419) . While Stephenson had no trouble opening the old Mkushi Boma in September 1900, Chief Chipepo's slave raiding Lenje, in August, gave Jones such a hostile reception that he evidently decided to accept an Mbwela elephant hunter's invitation to open his boma at Kapopo, along the upper Kafue River (Denny, 1957: 331-34; Macpherson, 1981: 29, 88; Stephenson n.d. b & 1937: 82-92) .
But the Lima near Kapopo Boma were also involved in the slave trade, and, in early 1901, threatened a general Lima, Lenje, Swahili, and Chikunda rebellion after one of their chiefs was killed while attempting to escape from jail (NR n.d. a; Stephenson, 1937: 203-9) . Though this affair was settled peacefully, the Kapopo Boma was effectively abandoned in 1903, when Jones returned to Wales. Perhaps Jones feared that he, like Stephenson (1937: 97, 238-41) , had been targeted for revenge by Chikunda assassins. Kapopo, though, was not completely abandoned, for by 1905 it was occupied by Adolph Ullman, a Jewish ivory and rubber trader from Bavaria (Doke, 1975: 44; Masters and Masters, 1920: 21-3, 47-8; Moubray, 1912: 103-4) .
Like the early Belgian posts at Lofoi and Lukafu, Muyanga Station and the Kapopo and Mkushi Bomas were, in Lambert-Culot's terminology, "outposts of occupation". Whereas many of the early BSAC bomas and Comite Special du Katanga posts along Lakes Tanganyika, Mweru, and the Luapula were established as "frontier surveillance posts" or resource "collection or transit posts" (Lambert-Culot, 1972: 302-3), Muyanga, Kapopo, and Mkushi were established to protect and advance European mining and commercial interests in areas which had only recently "been taken in hand" (BSAC, 1903: 406) . By establishing an effective colonial presence, these new and alien centers were meant "to impress upon the inhabitants that they were now under new, powerful masters who had to be obeyed" (Rennie and Mubita, 1985: 53) . Macpherson, 1981: 191; Stephenson, 1937: 215-26) . The tax required cash and as Stephenson (1937: 221) later observed, cash meant wages and the consequent disruptions of labor migration to the mines. Since the tax and administrative (but not commercial) revenues for the 1901-02 fiscal year covered only 28 percent of NorthEastern Rhodesia's expenditures, the purpose of the hut tax was to encourage the flow of recruited (chibaro) labor to the Southern Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (Gelfand, 1961: 96-7, 151-2; Macpherson, 1981: 129, 148, 157-8; Perrings, 1979: 14-15 ).
These new tax and labor demands were widely resented, especially around Kansanshi and the Kafue Hook mines. The Silver King alone employed 1,000 laborers by the end of 1901, plus another 700 porters. But the customary floggings there, as well as other, more tortuous forms of managerial discipline, led to frequent labor desertions from the very beginning. Traders and mine employees also beat neighboring villagers and stole their wives and cattle. So the tax collection efforts only fueled anti-European sentiments (Macpherson, 1981: 89-90, 194-5) . Beginning with Mwomboshi Boma (south of Broken Hill/Kabwe) in 1902, a wider network of bomas and police camps were established between the Kafue and Luangwa Rivers, where shackles, floggings, and hut and granary burnings were commonly used to punish tax defaulters. The Ila took up arms in 1905 and again in 1907, but were put down both times by a Barotse Native Police detachment and its Maxim gun (Gelfand, 1961: 48-9; Macpherson, 1981: 89-92, 111-13, 120-4, 198; Masters and Masters, 1920: 157-65; Stephenson, 1937: 265-9 ).
The Lamba, by comparison, adopted more peaceful means of resistance. Tax collection was limited, at first, to the areas nearest Kapopo and Mkushi Bomas (BSAC, 1903: 408; Stephenson, 1937: 227) . So long as Jones and Stephenson remained preoccupied with slave traders, and with the slaving, ivory and rubber smuggling activities, and inheritance disputes among Chiwala's Swahili, the Lamba villagers were able to evade their tax and labor obligations by hiding in the bush. This, however, became more difficult after 1902, when a BSAC Rubber Conservator was posted to Chiwala's (Ndola) village (BSAC, 1903: 416-7; Hobson, 1960: 494-5) ; and nearly impossible after July 1904, when, "in order to keep an eye on the [Swahili] Coastmen...and to help the Europeans now developing Bwana Mkubwa [mine]," Stephenson opened the first Ndola Boma (near Monkey Fountain Park), to the west of the later town (Stephenson n.d. b; also Brelsford, 1965a: 295-6; Jordan, 1956; Stephenson, 1965b: 117-18) . As Stephenson (n.d. b) later described it, this was a time of "latent hostility, unsubmissiveness, and civil disobedience (as far as could be dared!)." Latent hostility and unsubmissiveness was the Lamba response to Stephenson's notoriously agressive administrative style. When first at Mkushi, "Chirupula" (The Flogger) Stephenson had earned quite a reputation for flogging Lala and Swaka tax defaulters, and for destroying their crops, huts, and granaries (Macpherson, 1981: 91-2; Stephenson, 1937: 174, 188-92, 215-36) . So when he demanded Lamba laborers to work on the road between Ndola and Mkushi, Chief Mushili refused and fled to a Katangan Lamba chief living near Mokambo (NR n.d. b, 1: 151-6; Stephenson n.d. b; 1937: 105 (BSAC, 1903: 411, 419) .
The first missionaries to the Rhodesian Copperbelt soon became similarly disappointed in the local Lamba. While eventually taken over by the South African Baptist Missionary Society in 1914, Kafulafuta Mission (southeast of Luanshya) was opened in December 1905 by two new English recruits to the Nyasa Industrial Mission near Blantyre (Cross, 1925; Masters and Masters, 1920: 1-26, 166-212) . Their initial enthusiasm soured, however, when the "disorganized but docile" Lamba, whom they counted "among the laziest of African people," proved less interested in the mission's Gospel than in its wages, its day school, and the limited training it provided in brick-making and carpentry (Masters and Masters, 1920: 181, 214) .
Thus the early colonial centers in this portion of the Central African Copperbelt were, in chronological order, the prospectors' camps and mines, the bomas, and the mission. While usually sited separately from one another, the bomas, and-given its industrial emphasis, even the mission-were designed to serve the extractive "collection posts" established by mining and commercial interests. By enforcing the hut tax, the boma officials tried to create a pool of migrant labor. But the Copperbelt bomas and its mission also helped generate the self-perpetuating ethnic stereotypes which rationalized early European disappointments with their uncooperative colonial wards (Siegel, 1983 and n.d.) .
THE MINES AND THE TOWNS: KANSANSHI, NDOLA, AND LUANSHYA
For nearly a decade Kansanshi was the most important center in both the Rhodesian and Katangan Copperbelt. Besides its role as the operations base for the TCL's Katangan headquarters-sited at Kambove (1901-4) , Ruwe (1904-10) , and L'Etoile (after 1910)-it was, by 1908, the base for 16 white miners and four labor recruiters, a medical doctor (from 1901-14), a nearby shopkeeper, and three white farmers. There were, at the time, another five officials and about a dozen white traders between the Kabompo and Kafue Rivers (Gelfand, 1961: 123-4; Perrings, 1979: 12-14, 19 ).
Kansanshi must have served them as well, for it was still the major transport depot north of the Broken Hill railhead (est. June 1906), and nearly 28,000 porters carried 650 tons of cargo from Broken Hill to Kansanshi, Kambove, and L'Etoile in 1908. "Chirupula" Stephenson's transport firm then employed 9,600 carriers, and took 80 passengers from Broken Hill to L'Etoile (near Elisabethville/ Lubumbashi); and Adolph Ullman, the Kapopo trader and the largest of the transport agents, employed 16,000 porters and took 65 passengers to Kansanshi and Kambove via Kapopo (Gelfand, 1961: 115; Moubray, 1912: 103-4) . Given this volume of activity, a sub-station of Kasempa Boma was opened at Kansanshi in 1909 (Clark, 1955: 64) .
The mine at Kansanshi also made it a major labor center. By 1913, a year before operations were suspended, Kansanshi employed 85 "local" (Kaonde) and 788 "imported" laborers, who were originally Ndebele. This number may have been lower than in earlier years, for, as in Katanga (Hoornaert n.d.) , there was much resentment of the coercive methods used by the TCL's "dago" labor recruiters. This, combined with the mine's poor food and seven day work week, and the terror generated by a head capitao's anti-European witchcraft cult, led to an ever worsening labor shortage (Gann, 1964: 123-4; Gelfand, 1961: 101-3; Macpherson, 1981: 167; Perrings, 1979: 21) . Relations with the Kaonde began deteriorating when the first district hut tax was introduced in 1907. The aggressive tax collection methods then in use had literally forced many Kaonde into the hands of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau recruiters. Many such recruits never returned from Bulawayo, for their mortality rates were more than double those of other laborers (Gelfand, 1961: 98-102) . Recruiting by the Labour Bureau in Kasempa District was ended in 1912 when, following the bloody manhunt for the revenge murderers of a Swedish prospector and the attempted shooting of the Kansanshi Sub-District Officer, "It became clear that the Kaonde were in a dangerous mood" (Clark, 1955: 64; also Chibanza, 1961: 70-74; Macpherson, 1981: 161-4) .
Further east, the development of the Bwana Mkubwa mine languished until September 1909, when the railway arrived and the mine replaced Broken Hill as the railhead to Katanga (Gann, 1964: 125-7; Gelfand, 1961: 114-15 ). The railway contractors had hired Katangan Lamba gangers for the line from Broken Hill to Elisabethville (Gann, 1958: 159) . But because the BSAC had already used the Luapula sleeping sickness scare to check the flow of African laborers to Katanga, it was thought that the use of these imported laborers threatened to spread the disease to the rest of the northern Rhodesian territories (Fetter, 1976: 41; Gelfand, 1961: 100; Gouldsbury and Sheane, 1911: 227, 348-9; Perrings, 1979: 15-18, 27-8, 38-44) . To allay these groundless fears, a medical officer was posted to Ndola Boma in March 1908 to certify that these laborers were free of infection (Gelfand, 1961: 185, 200) . The three mud and pole bungalows that constituted Old Ndola Boma lay well to the west of Bwana Mkubwa and the trail to L'Etoile (Jordan 1956 ). Thus when R.R. Sharp left L'Etoile in 1908, he found the "first outpost of civilization"--and a case of Guinness stout--at J. Thom's store on the Kafulafuta River, south of the mine (Sharp, 1956: 94) .
The Ndola Boma medical officer was moved east, near the railway contractors' compound, in July 1909. The new Ndola village was just under construction, and included the African Lakes Company and Stephenson's trade and transport firms. By March 1910, most of the Europeans in Ndola District were in or near the village. These 58 men and six women included 17 at Bwana Mkubwa and 16 with the railway, 13 traders and seven on farms, five government officials, the five Kafulafuta missionaries, and one labor agent. As Ndola assumed many of Kansanshi's former functions, the Old Ndola Boma was abandoned for the railway site in 1911 (Brelsford, 1965a: 295-6; Gelfand, 1961: 124, 240-41; Masters and Masters 1920: 47) .
There is, unfortunately, no known count of Ndola's African population at this time. Native Commissioner Moffat Thomson's village regrouping campaign, by destroying scattered family villages, probably encouraged some Lamba to settle near Chiwala's village, where the Swahili were growing rice and maize for sale (Jordan, 1956; Macpherson, 1981: 179; Masters and Masters, 1920: 213) . Others were probably drawn to the railway and Bwana Mkubwa compounds, for by the 1920s, when the Swahili were moved to the north and east of Ndola, Lamba market gardeners were scattered around the mine and the various railway sidings south of Ndola (NR n.d. c: 1925 and 1926 ; NR, NRC n.d. 1: 312 and 2: 23, 31-4, 40, 46, 82-3, 92, 117-18) .
Though the effects of the railway were far less dramatic than in Elisabethville, where it arrived in December 1910, it did increase Ndola's demand for labor and also made it a major labor transit center. Once Robert Williams and Company's Northern Rhodesian labor recruits were permitted to return to L'Etoile in May 1911, those coming by rail had to pass the inspection of the Ndola Boma medical officer (Fetter, 1976: 41; Gelfand, 1961: 103) . But the railway ran south as well, and it placed most of northeastern Northern Rhodesia within a three week journey of Bulawayo and the other southern mines (Gouldsbury and Sheane 1911: 328, 345-6) . As the competition for Northern Rhodesian labor increased, the Belgians interpreted this interest in African health concerns as yet another plot by the BSAC and its president, L.S. Jameson of the Jameson Raid, to control Katanga by manipulating its labor supplies (Fetter, 1976: 41-71; Perrings, 1979:3 8-44, 50-54) .
Ndola gained greater prominence as a transit center during World War I as the railhead for the German East African campaign. Porters carried supplies across the Pedicle from Ndola to Kabunda, and then, following an African traders' route, canoed up the Luapula to Lake Bangweulu and the Chambeshi and Lukuku Rivers (Gelfand, 1961: 273; Gouldsbury and Sheane, 1911: 330-31) . Because of their work in the Katangan mines, the peoples of the Mweru-Luapula region were not conscripted as war carriers until 1916. So a good portion of the government's 193,000 "native carriers", and probably most of the government's and traders' 39,100 porters from the northwestern districts, must have passed through Ndola (Fetter, 1976: 60; Gelfand, 1961: 273-5) . Ndola District, like those of Mkushi and Serenje, lost most of its able-bodied men to the conscription effort, and it suffered from the Spanish influenza epidemic afterwards (Cross, 1925: 26; Doke, 1975: 73, 171-81; Macpherson, 1981: 169-70, 175-6; N R n.d. c: 1920) . Until 1926, the Ndola "native carriers" continued to take mail and cargo as far as Solwezi and Abercom (Mbala) Bomas (NR n.d. b 1: 172).
After the war, most of the Africans employed in Ndola District were working for white farmers, traders, or the railway. Most of the Kafue Hook mines had closed in 1907, when the Ila rebellion coincided with a drop in world copper prices. The Sable Antelope and Kansanshi closed by the end of 1914, and Bwana Mkubwa in 1920 (Doke, 1975: 110-11; Gann,1964: 122-3; RCM, 1978: 22 (Fetter, 1976: 33-4, 74) , Ndola remained a relatively small administrative and trading center. Then in 1922, two years before surrendering the Northern Rhodesian administration to the British Colonial Office, the BSAC sold extensive land tracts in Ndola District to large multinational mining corporations. Following the sudden infusion of capital, the Bwana Mkubwa, Kansanshi, Roan Antelope, Nkana, Mufulira, Nchanga, and Chambishi copper claims were all being mined or under development by 1930 (Gann,1964: 206-9; RCM, 1978: 22-31 The District's African population also rose, for beginning in December 1925, the administration began directing its migrant laborers to the Copperbelt by setting diminishing quotas for migrants to Katanga (Fetter, 1976: 89) . While the early employment data are incomplete and tend to obscure the high turnover rates, they indicate that almost 4,000 Africans--nearly 85 percent of them from Nyasaland and from eastern and north-eastern Northern Rhodesia--were working on the Ndola District mines in 1926 , and 15,000 in 1929 (NR n.d. c: Reports 3/1926 , 12/1926 , and 12/1929 .
CENSUS OF EUROPEAN RESIDENTS AND AFRICAN EMPLOYEES
These same events also affected the local Lamba of Ndola District. First, they became hosts to immigrant Lamba and Seba villagers from Katanga. These had been hounded by the insatiable food and labor demands of the Pedicle's private labor recruiters, and then driven from their lands to accommodate an anticipated influx of white farmers along the railway corridor between Sakania and Elisabethville (Fetter, 1968: 51-2; Higginson, 1979: 152, 175, 179-82; NR, DNA 1933; NR, NRC n.d. 1: 31, 59, 219, and 2: 46, 59 This rapid population increase posed new problems for Ndola's Village Management Board, established in 1920. The old village, clustered about the railway depot, could not accommodate the demand for European business and residential plots. By 1928, when the government Survey Department was laying out an extension grid, many of Ndola's whites had already taken plots on a former farmer's private township to the north. Under the provisions of the 1929 Town Planning Ordinance, the developed portion of this estate was eventually annexed to Ndola (Gardiner, 1970: 5-8) .
Less attention was given to the housing needs of Ndola's African population. As in Elisabethville, servants and their families were generally allotted quarters in their employers' yards, while all others were expected to build their own housing in the private employers' or government camps on the periphery of town (Epstein, 1981: 18-22; Fetter, 1976: 34, 57, 115-16) . The miners were Bwana Mkubwa's problem. Towns like Ndola were viewed as European enclaves, and while Africans were permitted to work and trade there, they were not considered acceptable residents (Gann, 1964: 146-48) .
Still, the crush of African immigrants was such that it compelled the Village Management Board to open Ndola's Main (or Old) Native Location to the south of town, on the eastern side of the railway and Itawa Stream in 1927. The same spatial segregation, supposedly for hygienic reasons, characterized the European and African townships of Elisabethville. The Main Location was divided into wards of some 40 to 60 one-room houses. Its residents were still under European control, for their rents were often paid by their employers. Yet from the very beginning these residents also included independent rate-payers, such as ivory workers, tailors, and other artisans. By 1929 these included two or three carpenters and "shoemakers" (the Copperbelt tin smiths), and two bakers. There were as yet no licensed African shopkeepers in the entire District, so it is likely that most of the African retail trade was entrusted to hawkers working for European merchants. As the Management Board carefully restricted the approval of bakehouse applications, it would appear that, like the African teashops in the 1950s, the sale of buns and scones was already a popular avenue of African enterprise (Epstein, 1981: 19-20; NR n.d. c: Reports 12/1926 and 12/1929) .
The siting of the newer mines, like Roan Antelope, was solely determined by the location of copper sulphide ores. Unfortunately for its workers, those at Roan Antelope were found within a swampy horseshoe bend of the Luanshya River--the home of the monstrous funkwe snake of Lamba legend (Doke, 1927: 246-9, and 1931: 318-19, 352-3; Stephenson, 1965a) . Thus when exploratory drilling in early 1926 justified further development in 1927, the residents of this squalid camp--some 40 Europeans and 900 Africans (NR n.d. c: Report 12/1926)--were afflicted with malaria and blackwater fever, and with pneumonia, typhus, and dysentery. Not surprisingly, the average African laborer in 1927 left the site after just three months (Gann, 1964: 209-10; Fisher, 1969; RCM, 1978: 28-32; Rodger, 1962; Watson, 1953: 13-14, 92-3) .
The local Lamba attributed Roan's high mortality rates to the funkwe snake and avoided the mine. But their fears only complicated Roan's labor problem until 1928, when, with the General Manager's full cooperation, the citrus farmer "Chirulupa" Stephenson arranged for the snake's exorcism (NR n.d. c: Reports 3/1926 , 12/1926 , 12/1927 , 12/1929 Stephenson 1965a) . The Lamba's aversion to underground work-together with their developing grain and market gardening industry, persistent food shortages in the area, and "kaffir-pox" epidemics-probably best explains why the Lamba were blackballed from Roan Antelope, where management regarded them as undisciplined and unreliable laborers of an inferior physical type (Spearpoint, 1937: 1-9; NR DNA 1934: 30) . Thus here, as in Katanga, the Lamba who did come to town were poorly represented among the African miners, who were mostly long-distance migrant laborers (Higginson, 1979: 218; Mitchell, 1954: 30, 32, and 1973: 295; Siegel, 1984: 381-2, 390-91) .
Roan Antelope was Ndola District's first company town. And while technically prohibited from doing so, the mine township opened five shops and began building its own hospital long before the government's Survey Department could determine the location for the public township (Luanshya) and its trading area (Gardiner, 1970: 10-11) . As a company town, Roan avoided much of the sprawling confusion which had marked the settlement of Ndola and Broken Hill (Gardiner, 1970: 5-8, 22-23; Gelfand, 1961: 240-44) . But this also meant that Roan's residents lived there at the sufferance of mine management, and were allocated housing according to their rank in the mine's hierarchy.
Here, as elsewhere, racial segregation was the rule, and Africans were assigned to thatched, mud brick rondavels. These were later converted to African married couples' quarters after 1929, when the "bachelors" were assigned to the "mosquito-proof" baked brick houses, with concrete floors and corrugated roofs, which were built as part of the malaria control program (Gann, 1965: 210-11; Perrings, 1979: 115n) . Within the Roan universe, the compound manager and the black mine police had greater power than the government officers, and it was the former who introduced the Tribal Elders Council in 1931. While created to settle miners' domestic and personal disputes according to necessarily flexible notions of customary law, this novel institutional so gave the Roan workers an unintended sense of independence from European authority (Epstein, 1958: 1-47 and 1981: 25-6; Fetter, 1976: 149-50; Spearpoint, 1937: 19-20) .
THE LAMBA AND THE NATIVE RESERVE
The copper boom of the 1920s also transformed life in the rural Copperbelt. The increased demands for food and labor hurt the mission and white farmers most, for they were unable to compete with the higher prices and wages paid by the mines and the towns (NR n.d. c : Reports 3 /1925 and 12/1926) and with the new, less onerous produce marketing opportunities for earning tax monies. Whereas European traders bought 4,000 200-lb bags of sorghum and maize in Ndola District in 1922, they bought 10,000 bags in 1927 and this does not include the sale of sweet potatoes, peanuts, or cassava (NR n.d. c: Reports 3/1923 and 12/1927) .
Together with the four "Koba" (Goan?) Mohammedi brothers who serviced the Bwana Mkubwa hotel and mine mess, Chiwala's Swahili seem to have been the leaders in the local produce marketing trade. As "the most expert agriculturalists in the country", the Swahili hired Lamba and other African laborers on their maize, sorghum, and dairy farms, selling to the Bwana Mkubwa and Nchanga mines (NR, NRC n.d. 1: 151; also 2: 3, 8, 20, 28) . The Swahili responded to this demand by growing more crops for sale, as was to be expected, but it appears that the Lamba, though a backward tribe and poorly thought of by those who know them (a missionary living among them says that the "smart boys" in his Mission school invariably have non-Lamba blood in them), were imitating Swahili methods and growing bigger crops in consequence (NR, NRC n.d. 1: 44-5).
Though this 1926 summary underestimates the role which the Kafulafuta Mission evangelists played in the proliferation of Lamba "kitchen gardens" and in early market gardening near Ndola (NR, NRC n.d. 2: 46; NR n.d. c: Report 3/1925) , it does explain the "inflated" wage and price demands experienced by the mission and white farmers. Grain and vegetable sales, by offering an alternative to wage labor, created "a tendency on the part of the villager to break away from tribal control and settle on his own near the local labour centres where he may live undisturbed and get a good price for his produce" (NR n.d. c: Report 3 /1926) . Local produce sales permitted the Lamba and their neighbors to seek employment on their own, strictly seasonal terms or, if they chose, to avoid it altogether (NR, NRC n.d. 1: 312, and 2: 23, 40, 46, 92, (NR n.d. c: Report 12/1926) .
But the Lamba had still other reasons for avoiding wage labor. For among the many migrants to Ndola District was Jeremiah Gondwe, a Tumbuka witch-finder and Watchtower movement prophet. As a leader in the final colonial episode of the Copperbelt's millenarian tradition, Gondwe surreptitiously preached among the Rhodesian Lamba from 1924 until his 1929 arrest. Unlike the murders incited by Tomo Nyirenda (Mwana Lesa) among the Lala to the east, Gondwe ran afoul of the administration for prophesying that four million black Americans would fly in to deliver the Lamba from the colonial regime and its chiefly puppets (Rotberg 1965: 140-6) . Following his 1932 release, Gondwe and his followers settled south of Luanshya near Ibenga at the new Franciscan Fathers' mission on the Kafulafuta River (Cross, 1970 and 1973: 271-84; Siegel, 1984: 368-70) .
The Lamba were particularly receptive to Gondwe's religious resistance movement, for during 1926 the Native Reserves Commission held hearings along the Copperbelt lineof-rail to decide how to vacate Lamba villagers from areas of existing and prospective mine and railway development. Formally instituted in 1928, the Ndola District Native Reserves recognized Chiwala's successor as a proper chief, awarded the Swahili their own reserve, and promised them compensation for their loss of lands. Lamba chief Mushili II, on the other hand, lost 80 percent of his territory without any compensation and most of his 23,000 Lamba crowded onto the fragile and sandy reserve lands nearest Luanshya, Ndola, and the railway corridor grain traders (Allan 1949: 26, 35, 42; NR n.d. c: Reports 12/1926 and 12/ 1929; NR, DA 1944: 5-6; Pim and Milligan 1938: 66-9) . While the Reserves Commission's official intent was to protectively isolate the Lamba from any future disturbances (NR, NRC 1: 75-76), its latent intent--in recognizing the "large body of evidence that the native having his home up against a centre of employment, tends to become a producer rather than a labourer" (NR, NRC 1: 312)--was to make cash-cropping so difficult as to compel the Lamba to enter the labor market. And they eventually did.
The administrative, commercial, and industrial centers of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt eagerly promoted economic development, but from 1900 to 1930 this meant the mines, and development was defined in strictly European terms. As the Lamba villagers were chased into the Lamba-Lima Native Reserve, the size and productivity of their gardens fell as increasing numbers of able-bodied men and women began drifting off into the towns. There, in dominating the low prestige occupational niches filled by house-boys, beer hall girls, and temporary wives, the urban African townsfolk sterotyped the impoverished Lamba as weak and backward country bumpkins. While aspects of these invidious stereotypes were eventually internalized, they also generated the internally resentful dimension of the Lamba ethnic identity--that of a people who believe that shrewd and clever strangers have systematically cheated them of the Copperbelt's lands and its mineral wealth (Siegel n.d.) Ironically, the Rhodesian Lamba did enjoy a brief, if wretched, prosperity from prostitution and suburban beer sales during the Depression and even hired unemployed townsfolk to cultivate their gardens. The Lamba in Katanga, while farther from the town, had a similar experience. For among these "poor devils at war with want", as District Commissioner Vermuelen described them:
...there has never been so much cash in the natives' hands than at present [1935] . The crops were abundant and they sold it all to the point where they haven't enough to feed themselves. A few weeks ago, the natives were even selling the little sorghum remaining to them in order to buy calicos. They need to be taught some prudence here, for by not properly feeding themselves, they expose themselves to all the epidemics (CB, AIMO n.d.: 9) .
While the Belgians tried to arrest this impoverishment by introducing compulsory village regrouping and foodcrop cultivations in the 1930s, such measures, together with higher taxes, only succeeded in driving at least 500 more Katangan Lamba across the border and into the overcrowded, northern third of the Lamba-Lima Native Reserve (Jewsiewicki, 1977: 327- (Keith n.d.: 6) 
SUMMARY
As suggested in this paper, the early colonial centers are not wholly responsible for the impoverishment of the Zambian Copperbelt's people. While it is difficult to assess Dr.
Lacerda's 1798 information that the "Arambas" were "peaceful friends of the Cazembe", the demands of the Lunda empire were not so great as to prevent the Lamba from working Chief Katanga's copper, Chief Mwanshya's salt pans, or from trading with the Africans living near the Portuguese post at Zumbo (Burton, 1873: 99; also Doke, 1927: 166-9, 370, 403, 452 ). Yet it is clear that these earlier redistributive exchange relations with the chiefly capitals changed to brutal parasitism in the late 19th century, when Msiri's Yeke at Bunkeya turned from extorting Lamba tribute to raiding them for slaves.
The Belgians and British also wanted the region's mineral ores and demanded Lamba food and labor. While their competition for Katanga saved the Lamba and their neighbors from Swahili and other slave traders, their outposts of occupation used the hut tax and the impersonal forces of the cash economy to extract local labor for the mines of Central and Southern Africa. The railway to Katanga created new urban centers and still higher levels of hut tax prosecutions (Fetter, 1983: 91-2) ; but in introducing a flood of labor migrants, it also provided the Lamba with an alternative cash-generating opportunity in the marketing of grains, root crops, fruits and vegetables. The Kafulafuta Mission encouraged this response, which was, perhaps, the single greatest spillover effect of the dramatic urban and industrial development in this part of Africa.
The rural consequences of the Copperbelt's colonial centers were, however, largely parasitic. Under the political economy established by the British South Africa Company (and the Comite Special du Katanga to the north), economic development was defined in strictly European terms and apart from the short-lived attempts to attract white farmers, was synonymous with the growth of the Copperbelt's industrial, administrative, and commercial centers. The African role in this development was in providing cheap labor. So when these centers unintentionally fostered a class of relatively autonomous African produce traders during the 1920s copper boom, the Lamba were chased from their peri-urban settlements onto the Native Reserve, where overcrowding and the inevitable ecological collapse forced increasing numbers into the urban labor market. Justifying this formula for rural poverty and economic stagnation was a set of invidious ethnic stereotypes which, while based upon the Lamba's historical response to the introduction of colonial rule, blamed the Lamba for their conditions (Siegel n.d.) .
Such stereotypes still endure today and continue to taint the Lamba's relations with the Copperbelt townsfolk and with other, more fortunate immigrant farmers (Siegel, 1984: 250ff) . Rural life continues to revolve around the social, economic, and political domination of these primate centers. The good life, by definition, is not to be found in the Copperbelt's villages. Such scarce monies for agricultural loans as do exist are necessarily directed, instead, to a few, better endowed family farmers. Thus much of the rural Copperbelt is still home to the very old, and to female-headed households (Siegel, 1979) . Village life may have its rewards, but these defy any reckoning in monetary terms.
While the indigenous poverty of the Copperbelt can be traced to its precolonial history, its rural stagnation is an artifact of the parasitic centers first established by the colonial political economy. This brand of parasitism differs from that described by Bert Hoselitz (1955) . He explained the permanent parasitism of colonial centers in terms of the disjuncture between the "orthogenetic" centralization of political and cultural forces, such as one might find in the urban centers of India or Indonesia, and the "heterogenetic" externalization of colonial economic forces. But Hoselitz's colonial centers were all pre-colonial capitals which later had been captured by intrusive, colonial economic interests. The Copperbelt's centers have nothing to do with the perpetual elaboration of indigenous political or cultural traditions, or with notions of sacred or economic space. Instead, all began as new and alien centers which were created, and then grew at the expense of the surrounding rural populace. In this respect, the Copperbelt centers are examples of a more radical form of parasitism.
In a recent, spatial analysis of the colonial centers in Malawi, Zambia, and Zaire, Bruce Fetter (1983) refutes the alternative forms of economic determinism espoused by dependency theorists and geographers. He argues, instead, for the primacy of political considerations in the siting of such centers and the consequent regional inequities in development. "Early colonial administrators," he says, "were far more concerned with the establishment of their colonial regimes than in pleasing capitalists." So in determining the colonial landscape, "the colonizers' political demands shaped the lives of Africans more than economic ones, though the two factors are not easily separable" (pp. 28-9). As Fetter (1983: 26, 192-3) admits, however, Northern Rhodesia, and the Copperbelt in particular, is a special case. The first outposts of occupation in these northern Rhodesian territories, after all, were established by the collectors for the British South Africa Company. And while such collectors opened Kapopo and Mkushi Bomas for purposes of political pacification, the ending of slave raids and the slave trade was designed to protect and promote still earlier mining and trading interests in the Copperbelt. Their early tax collection efforts represented more than a demonstration of coercive authority. For like the village regrouping campaign in the 1910s, and the removal of villages to the Native Reserves in the 1920s, this was also a bid for economic control over Lamba livelihoods and labor.
In my view, it is not only difficult, but impossible to disentangle the political and economic interests which created the Copperbelt's parasitic centers and their legacy of rural stagnation. In this part of Central Africa (and including much of old Katanga), it makes little difference whether one emphasizes the political or the economic considerations. The distinction is artificial, for they were complementary and mutually irreducible aspects of the same peculiar political economy, one established during the period of Chartered Company rule.
